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Abstract
There is a common belief that humans and many animals follow transitive
inference (choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than
B and B is better than C). Transitivity seems to be the essence of rational
choice. We present a theoretical model of a repeated game in which the
players make a choice between three goods (e.g. food). The rules of the game
refer to the simple procedure of fair division among two players, known as
the “I cut, you choose” mechanism which has been widely discussed in the
literature. In this game one of the players has to make intransitive choices in
order to achieve the optimal result (for him/her and his/her co-player). The
point is that an intransitive choice can be rational. Previously, an increase in
the significance of intransitive strategies was achieved by referring to models
of quantum games. We show that relevant intransitive strategies also appear
in the classic description of decision algorithms.
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1. Introduction
In this work we analyse a simple model of a repeated game of choice. This
is an interesting modification of our earlier work [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. To illustrate
the problem we refer to the history of two players - cats (older and younger)
that are making a choice between three types of food, no. 0, no. 1, and no. 2
(e.g. milk, meat and fish) in the following way: at the beginning of each
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stage the older cat rejects one of the foods. Then the younger cat selects and
consumes one food from the other two. The food that was rejected by the
younger cat is consumed by the older one. The same procedure is repeated in
each iteration of the game. Let us assume that both players tend to obtain
an equal contribution of each of the foods in their diet (i.e. one third for
food no. 0, no. 1 and no. 2, respectively). The optimum consists in not
distinguishing any of the three foods. Each of the foods is equally important
to each of the players.
The game quoted above is interesting for at least two reasons. Firstly,
because the course of the game refers to a procedure that has been widely
discussed in the literature. It is the simple procedure of fair (and envy-free)
division among two players, known as the “I cut, you choose” mechanism
[6]. According to this rule one of the players makes a certain division, e.g.
splits the pie into two parts, whereas the second player chooses one of the
parts for him or herself. The second part of the pie falls to the player who
made the cut. Therefore, the player who has made the division will certainly
get at least half of the goods according to his/her own valuation. On the
other hand, the player who makes the choice takes the part he/she prefers,
so he/she can decide to take over that part which seems to make up at least
half of the pie, as measured by his/her own assessment. A similar procedure
is present in our game, where the older cat acts as the cutting player and
the younger cat as the choosing one. The very procedure may be treated as
a specific mechanism designed to be resistant to bluffs and cheating.
The second reason why the offered game appears interesting is its relation
with the notion of transitivity-intransitivity of preferences. We can observe
how the players’ execution of the procedure of fair division “I cut, you chose”
influences the type of strategy (transitive or intransitive) they use. It appears
that intransitive orders (considered by many researchers to be paradoxical)
are a natural consequence of a conjunction of assumptions: a desire to obtain
a variety of foods and a fair division of the available set of foods. A rejection
of intransitivity means that one of these two requirements will have to be
revised.
2. A brief introduction to intransitivity
I remember that at the age of eight or nine I tried to rate the
fruits I liked in order of “goodness”. I tried to say that a pear
was better than an apple, which was better than a plum, which
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was better than an orange, until I discovered to my consternation
that the relation was not transitivenamely, plums could be better
than nuts which were better than apples, but apples were better
than plums. I had fallen into a vicious circle, and this perplexed
me at that age. Mathematicians’ ratings are something like this.
Stanisaw Ulam [7]
The relation , defined on elements of a certain set, is called transitive if
A  C follows from the fact that A  B and B  C for any three elements A,
B, C. If this condition is not satisfied then the relation is called intransitive
(not transitive).
The principle of the transitivity of preference is one of the basic assump-
tions of choice theory. It is often identified with the rationality of the players.
The adoption of this assumption is probably a consequence of transitive in-
ference. This ability is developed during childhood, i.e. at the age of four
or five [8]. It allows children to reason that if A is bigger than B, and B
is bigger than C, then A is also bigger than C. According to Jean Piaget,
understanding transitive inference leads to the formation of skills of measur-
ing, organising elements and deductive thinking in childhood [8]. Transitive
inference saves a large amount of time and energy in daily decision-making.
This reasoning has been confirmed in some animal species [9, 11, 10] (though
there is no evidence that animals use it consciously). One of the main ar-
guments put forward by many experts that proves the irrationality of pref-
erences which violate transitivity is the so-called “money pump” [12, 13].
According to this argument, anyone who exhibited intransitive preferences
would be punished by losing his/her entire wealth. On the other hand, some
generalisations of utility theory have been considered which dispense of the
transitivity assumption [14].
Despite the fact that intransitivity appears to be contrary to our intu-
ition, life provides many examples of intransitive orders. There is mounting
evidence based on empirical observations of choice behaviour that people do
not have preferences that are consistent with transitivity [22]. This suggests
that transitivity does not describe people’s preferences well. Rivalry between
species may be intransitive [15]; for example, among fungi, Phallus impudi-
cus replaces Megacollybia platyphylla, M. platyphylla replaces Psathyrella
hydrophilum, but P. hydrophilum replaces P. impudicus [16]. Similarly, an
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experiment can be found which presents the behavior of bees making intran-
sitive choices between flowers [17]. The best known and socially significant
example of intransitivity is Condorcet’s voting paradox [18], in which col-
lective preferences can be intransitive even if the preferences of individual
voters are not (this means that majority preferences can be in conflict with
each other). Consideration of this paradox led Arrow (in the 20th century) to
prove the theorem that there is no procedure of successful choice that would
meet a democratic assumption [19]. Interesting examples of intransitivity
are provided by probability models (Efron’s dice [20], Penney’s game [21]).
Intransitivity models appear in many sciences (seemingly distant) including
psychology [22], philosophy [23], operations research [24], coevolution [25],
thermodynamics [26], quantum theory [2], logic [27].
3. Details of the model
Let us assume that cats are always offered the same three types of food
(no. 0, no. 1 and no. 2). The first player, older cat, chooses and rejects one
of the foods. Then the second player, younger cat, selects and consumes one
of the remaining two foods. The older cat eats the food that is left. Let us
also assume that the cats will never refrain from making the choice of food.
The behaviour of the first player is limited to one choice of food to be
eliminated of the three, so that the strategy can be described by the point
(P0, P1, P2) of a three dimensional simplex, where Pi denotes the frequency
of the choice of a respective food (numbered by i) to be thrown away.
The younger cat chooses between the two foods that, are left. Num-
ber P (Ck|Bj) denotes the probability of choosing (by the younger cat) food
number k when the offered pair of dishes does not contain food number j.
Six conditional probabilities P (Ck|Bj), k, j = 0, 1, 2, k 6= j determine the
behaviour of the younger cat with respect to the proposed it in pairs food
portions – the frequency of their offer.
The younger cat’s strategy space is a three-dimensional cube of three
independent, conditional probabilities (we explicitly obtain the other three
from the condition of normalisation of the probability measure to unity). A
diagram of the game is shown in Fig. 1.
Let λk and ωk denot the frequencies of appearance of the particular foods
in the older and the younger cats diet, respectively. For the older cat, they
are following:
λ0 = P (C2|B1)P1 + P (C1|B2)P2,
4
START
READ cat1 ∈ {0, 1, 2}CAT1 MOVE
cat1 → p
SHOW p
READ cat2 ∈ {0, 1}CAT2 MOVE
p+ cat2 + 1mod 3→ p
p→ cat2
3− cat1 − cat2 → cat1
SHOW cat1, cat2
GAME OVER
Figure 1: Each iteration of the game. Symbol textsl mod n is the remainder of
the division by n. Older and younger cat – respectively cat1 i cat2.
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Figure 1: Each iteration of the game. Symbol mod n i the r mainder of the division by
n. Older and the younger cat – respectively cat1 i cat2.
λ1 = P (C0|B2)P2 + P (C2|B0)P0, (1)
λ2 = P (C1|B0)P0 + P (C0|B1)P1 ,
and for the younger cat we get:
ω0 = P (C0|B1)P1 + P (C0|B2)P2,
ω1 = P (C1|B0)P0 + P (C1|B2)P2, (2)
ω2 = P (C2|B0)P0 + P (C2|B1)P1.
The portions of food are equally attractive to them and necessary, because
they contain all components to maintain good health. So the most valuable
way to select foods corresponds to:
λ0 = λ1 = λ2 =
1
3
, (3)
ω0 = ω1 = ω2 =
1
3
. (4)
To simplify the notation of the equations we introduce three parameters
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ti ∈ [−1, 1], i = 0, 1, 2:
P (C2|B0) = 1 + t0
2
, P (C1|B0) = 1− t0
2
,
P (C0|B1) = 1 + t1
2
, P (C2|B1) = 1− t1
2
, (5)
P (C1|B2) = 1 + t2
2
, P (C0|B2) = 1− t2
2
.
Then the equations (3) and (4) take the form:
− t1P1 + t2P2 = 2/3− (P1 + P2) ,
−t2P2 + t0P0 = 2/3− (P0 + P2) , (6)
−t0P0 + t1P1 = 2/3− (P0 + P1) .
t1P1 − t2P2 = 2/3− (P1 + P2) ,
t2P2 − t0P0 = 2/3− (P0 + P2) , (7)
t0P0 − t1P1 = 2/3− (P0 + P1) .
By adding the appropriate equations from (6) and (7) we obtain
Pk =
1
3
, k = 0, 1, 2,
while by subtracting we get
tm
tn
=
Pn
Pm
= 1 .
The only strategies that meet both conditions (3) and (4) is the family corre-
sponding to Pk =
1
3
, for k = 0, 1, 2 (the older cat strategy) and six conditional
probabilities (the younger cat strategy):
P (C2|B0) = P (C0|B1) = P (C1|B2) = 1 + t
2
,
P (C1|B0) = P (C2|B1) = P (C0|B2) = 1− t
2
, (8)
where t ∈ [−1, 1] . Let’s look at a set of the younger cat’s strategies (their
type: transitive or intransitive).
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We say that a player prefers food no. 1 to food no. 0 (1  0) when
he/she is willing to choose food no. 1 more often than food no. 0 from the
offered pair (0, 1) (P (C1|B2) > P (C0|B2)). The situation corresponds to an
intransitive choice if one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
1. P (C0|B2) < P (C1|B2), P (C1|B0) < P (C2|B0), P (C2|B1) < P (C0|B1) ,
2. P (C0|B2) > P (C1|B2), P (C1|B0) > P (C2|B0), P (C2|B1) > P (C0|B1) .
Note that condition 2. is fulfilled if t ∈ [−1, 0), while for condition 1. to be
satisfied it is necessary to put t ∈ (0, 1]. This means that if the older cat
plays Pk =
1
3
, for k = 0, 1, 2, then the younger cat must make intransitive
choices (!) in order to meet conditions (6) and (7) (an extreme case for t = 0
can be classified as intransitive indifference strategy).
4. Election interpretation
The model discussed above may be fruitfully interpreted from an elective
point of view by referring to the procedure of two-phase elections which is
well known in many countries. Let us assume that there are three candidates
running in the election. The first phase eliminates one of the candidates,
and the final choice between the remaining two candidates is made during the
second phase. The choosing player in both phases is the same, i.e. the society.
We look at this player from the standpoint of the passing of time (between the
first and second phase). However, during the first phase of the election the
choice (the rejection of one candidate) is made by the older society, whereas,
during the second phase the younger society.1 The assumptions of the game
discussed in the paper adhere to a certain specific situation, when noone of
the candidates enjoys advantage over the others. Any of them has equal
chance to win in the second phase. Any of them has equal chance to loose
in the second phase. This matches the condition which requires that the
probability of rejection of any candidate in the second phase (in the previous
model it was the frequency of foods falling to the older cat) was equal to
1/3. It appears that when the collective elector i.e. the society is indecisive
1The adjectives “older” and “younger” do not refer here to the different players; they
denote the same player making a choice at various times (the first and second phase).
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(does not favour any of the candidates) then its preference during the second
phase is always intransitive. This result is compatible with intuition. If the
society is indecisive then the election is non-conclusive just as intransitive
preferences are considered to be.
5. Conclusion
In papers [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] we considered (in the context of the intransitivity
of strategy) a game which has become an inspiration for our discussion here.
The game’s participant was a cat that made its choice from among three
foods. In these models the problem basically concerned only one player,
whereas the second player (so-called Nature) was not interested in the result
of the game. This article presents a situation where both players strive to
achieve a specific result. Additionally, the players perform sequential steps
according to the procedure derived from the simplest method of fair division
“I cut, you choose”. It appears that under such conditions the dividing player
(the older cat) does not prefer any of the three foods and rejects any of them
with a probability of 1/3. It is natural to assume that the share of each of the
foods in the cat’s diet should be equal(condition (3)). It is surprising that
the choosing player (the younger cat) may only use intransitive strategies.
Therefore, an individual who is convinced that it is only acceptable to make
choices based on a transitive order would not be able to fulfil the assumptions
of the game presented here. Within our model the intransitive strategies have
managed to entirely rule out the transitive ones. These are the so-called rel-
evant intransitive strategies [5], i.e. strategies for which one cannot indicate
transitive strategies with identical consequences. Previously, an increase in
the significance of intransitive strategies was achieved by referring to models
of quantum games [2] (see also [28, 29]). Let us note that this fundamental
qualitative change (compared to the model with one cat and Nature) will be
achieved when the requirement to use the food that was not chosen by the
younger cat is introduced. This implies associations concerning the manage-
ment of waste and the closing of the ecological cycle. Intransitive loops are
considered in research studies on ecosystem models [30, 31]. In this article
we analysed the classical model in which there is a complete domination of
intransitive strategies. We found the relation of this result with the method
“I cut, you choose” to be particularly interesting because the problem of
fair division is an allegory of many substantial decision-related issues in our
everyday lives (negotiations of agreements, division of property, etc.). Thus
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it comes as no surprise that researchers from various fields of science present
their interest in this issue. Intransitive orders are, perhaps, not as paradox-
ical as they seem to be at first sight. The example of the game analysed in
the present paper demonstrates that it might be a very promising direction
of research to look for relations between procedures of fair division and the
notion of intransitivity. This may result in many noteworthy observations
and conclusions in the future.
This work is inspired by the thoughts of Hugo Steinhaus, who described
experiments with cats in his diary [32]. It turns out that a cat, when facing
the choice between fish, meat and milk, prefers fish to meat, meat to milk,
and milk to fish! Steinhaus argued that intransitive preference protects the
cat from the fate of Buridan’s ass. It is worth mentioning that Steinhaus is
also one of the leading promoters of fair distribution problems [33].
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